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RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS IN EMINENT
DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS:
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO. v. BOURGERIE1

The extent to which negative building restrictions should be compensable2 in eminent domain s proceedings is a matter which has divided American courts. The majority view is that restrictive covenants
create property rights and, therefore, are compensable when taken
by eminent domain.4 The minority position, however, is that such
restrictions are "mere?' contractualrights enforceable against private parties in equity but not binding upon the sovereign.5 In Southern Cali1. 9 Cal. 3d 169, 507 P.2d 964, 107 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1973).
2. Illustrative of other interests deemed compensable are (1) easements, People ex
rel. Dept. of Pub. Works v. Buelton Dev. Co., 58 Cal. App. 2d 178, 136 P.2d 793
(1943); (2) right of access, Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d
818 (1943); Liddick v. Council Bluffs, 5 N.W.2d 361 (Iowa 1942); (3) reversionary
interests, East-San Mateo Land Co. v. Southern Pac. R.R., 30 Cal. App. 223, 157 P.
634 (1916); (4) leasehold estates, Kishlar v. Southern Pac. R.R., 134 Cal. 636, 66
P. 848 (1901); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Berlin, 130 A. 741 (N.H. 1925).
3. See Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229 (1861), wherein the court explains the
derivation of the phrase "eminent domain":
To each and every sovereignty belong dertain rights which are deemed essential
to its existence. These are called by the civilians jura majestatis, or rights of
sovereignty. Among them is the lus eminens, or the supreme power of the state
over its members and whatever belongs to them. When applied to property alone,
it is called dominjum eminens, or the right of eminent domain; that is, the right
of the sovereignty to use the property of its members for the public good or public
necessity.
Id. at 250.
4. See, e.g., Bauby v. Krasow, 139 A. 508 (Conn. 1927); C. CLAR, CoVENANTS
AND INTERESTS RUNNING Wrm THE LAND 171-74 (2d ed. 1947); Ames, Specific Perforinance for and Against Strangers to the Contract, 17 HARv. L. REv. 174, 177
(1904); Stone, Equitable Rights and Liabilities of Strangers to a Contract, 18 CoLuM.
L. REv. 291, 293 (1918).
5. Moses v. Hazen, 69 F.2d 842, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1934); Pound, The Progress of
the Law, 1918-1919 Equity, 33 HARv. L. REv. 813 (1919-1920); Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d
1137 (1965). Because building restrictions are equitable in nature, their enforcement
is governed by equitable principles (Wing v. Forest Lawn Cemetery Ass'n, 15 Cal. 2d
472, 101 P.2d 1099 (1940)), and the granting of relief is governed by the general
principles which control the power to compel specific performance of contracts. Ludgate v. Somerville, 256 P. 1043 (Ore. 1927). Injunctive relief is also available as a
remedy against the breach of a restrictive covenant. Brown v. Huber, 88 N.E. 322
(Ohio 1909). When equitable relief has for some reason been refused, some courts
will require the parties to seek their remedies at law. Bickell v. Moraio, 167 A. 722
(Conn. 1933). Other courts, however, have said that such restrictive covenants can
be enforced at law only between the original parties (Welitoff v. Kohl, 147 A. 390
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fornia Edison Co. v. Bourgerie,8 the California Supreme Court rejected
the minority view7 and held for the first time that restrictive covenants

are compensable property rights.8 Not only does the decision provide
a new compensable interest in property, it arguably affords a foundation permitting awards of compensation for the loss of other interests
not presently compensable in eminent domainY Furthermore, Bourgerie appears to reflect a trend on the part of the Supreme Court
of California to maximize the remedies of local residents disadvantaged by environmentally disruptive developments.
In providing a basis for compensation, Justice Mosk, writing for the
majority, suggested that the most productive analysis was not to be
located in a distinction between contract and property rights, for "prag-

matic considerations of public policy, rather than abstract doctrines of
property law,"10 guide decision making in this area.

By rejecting the

argument that provision for compensation would discourage development, the court has produced a decision which refashions the balance
between the necessity for public projects and the desirability of local
control over local development through private zoning, i.e., restrictive
covenants. This Note will trace the background leading to the decision, evaluate the arguments relating to it, and explore its potential
consequences for land development and local control in California.
I.

THE TAKING

OF INTANGIBLE PROPERTY RIGHTS

Eminent domain is defined as the "right of the people or government to take private property for public use."' 1 The exercise of this
power is subject to the prohibitions found in the Constitution of the

United States.'"

Considerable controversy, however, has arisen as to

(N.J. 1929)), and that other parties to a conveyance which contains a covenant in
their favor cannot sue at law upon the covenant. Giliert v. Reteler, 38 N.Y. 165
(1867).
6. 9 Cal. 3d 169, 507 P.2d 964, 107 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1973).
7. The court in Bourgerie expressly overruled Friesen v. City of Glendale, 209 Cal.
524, 288 P. 1080 (1930) and impliedly disapproved of Sackett v. Los Angeles School
Dist., 118 Cal. App. 254, 5 P.2d 23 (1931). The latter had stated:
The courts of California have, however, declined tO recognize a building restriction
of the character here under consideration as a positive easement or right in the
land, but have defined it to be merely a right enforceable in equity as between the
parties to the contract, or their successors with notice, and have said that it is in
the nature of a negative easement or equitable servitude.
Id. at 255, 5 P.2d at 24.
8. 9 Cal. 3d at 171, 507 P.2d at 965, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
9. See notes 102-08 infra and accompanying text.
10. 9 Cal. 3d at 173, 507 P.2d at 967, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
11. CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 1237 (West 1967).
1?. U.$. QONST. amend. V; "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
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the meaning of the term "property" and its relationship to the concept
of "taking."
Historically, "taking" required a direct physical appropriation of property.13 This rigid approach often resulted in a denial of compensation,
despite obvious loss, on the grounds that there was no taking of possession, no physical invasion of the property, or no substantial interference with a clearly defined property interest or estate.' 4
In an effort to afford compensation in situations where the above
requirements were not satisfied, state courts sought to expand the
scope of the term "taking" by further clarifying its relationship to the
concept of "property." An early case exemplifying this more liberal
interpretation is Eaton v. Boston C. & M.R.R. Co. 15 wherein the New
Hampshire Supreme Court, in allowing recovery for damage from the
overflow of water onto plaintiff's land caused by the construction of a
railroad, rejected the physical appropriation approach to "taking of
property" and, instead, stressed interference with "use" as the crucial inquiry. The court stated:
The vital issue then is, whether the injuries complained of amount to
a taking. . . within the constitutional meaning. . .. The constitutional
prohibition . . .has received . . . a construction which renders it of
comparatively little worth, being interpreted much as if it read: "No
person shall be divested of the formal title to property without compenproperty, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation."
13. For a modem approach, see, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14, which provides in
part: "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation having first been made to ... the owner .... "
14. See Bakken v. State Highway Comm'n, 382 P.2d 550 (Mont. 1963). There
plaintiff brought an action against the State Highway Commission alleging damages
caused by the depreciation of his real property and personal hardship by reason of
the proposed construction of an interstate highway through Glendive, Montana. Plaintiff, a home building contractor, had been unable to sell, lease, develop, or finance his
real property for building homes since 1957 because of the proposed interstate highway.
The Montana constitution provided that the actual value as of the date of service of
summons was to be the measure of compensation for all property to be actually taken
and the basis of depreciation in value of property not actually taken, but injuriously
affected. MONT. CONsT. art. III, § 14 (1889). The court found that the plaintiff had
no cause of action for the taking or damaging of his property as land and was not damaged by reason of preliminary procedure looking to its appropriation to a public use. Although plaintiff's land had in fact depreciated in value, compensation for diminution
in value of property was held not to include infringements of the owner's personal use
or enjoyment. 382 P.2d at 551.
15. 12 Am. R. 147 (N.H. 1872). A railroad corporation acting under legislative
authority removed a natural barrier situated south of Eaton's land, which served to protect his property from the effect of floods from a neighboring river. As a result, in
time of flo6d, water flowed onto the land carrying sand, gravel, and stone.
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sation, but he may without compensation, be deprived of all that makes
the title valuable."
To constitute a "taking of property," it seems -to have sometimes been
held necessary that there should be "exclusive appropriation," "a total
assumption of possession," "a complete ouster," an absolute or total conversion of the entire property. . . . "Property is the right of any person
to possess, use, enjoy, and dispose of a thing."
If property in land consists in certain essential rights, and a physical
interference with the land substantially subverts one of those rights, such
interference "takes," pro tanto, the owner's '"property."... "Use is the
real side of property."'6
Although the damage due to overflowing was consequential in the
sense that it did not follow immediately after construction, the court
allowed recovery. The damage was considered to be an actual interference with Eaton's use and possession, and one which would have
7
been actionable if done by a private party without judicial authority.'
Thus, the question of whether or not an injury constituted a "taking"
of property became dependent upon the character of the invasion and
the effect of the invasion upon proprietary rights. These proprietary
rights were no longer limited to the physical land itself, but included
those rights incident to ownership. A "taking' no longer required
a direct physical appropriation, but included injuries which constituted
a substantial interference with the rights of use, enjoyment, and possession.'
This liberalizing trend initiated by state courts was given further
impetus by a series of Supreme Court decisions which attempted to
expand the scope of the taking requirement. In Pumpelly v. Green
Bay Co.,19 United States v. Lynah,20 and United States v. Cress,2 1 the
Court held that there were constitutional "takings," even though the
government had not directly appropriated the title, possession, or use
of the properties. The decisive factor in each case was that an overflow of water onto the claimant's land, during governmental dam con16. Id. at 151 (emphasis added and citations omitted).
17. Id. See Stock v. Cox, 6 A.2d 346 (Conn. 1939); Eller v. Board of Educ., 89
S.E.2d 144 (N.C. 1955); Griswold v. Town School Dist., 88 A.2d 829 (Vt. 1952).
18. See Town of Bedford v. United States, 23 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1927); Woodside
v. City of Atlanta, 103 S.E.2d 108 (Ga. 1958); Schuster v. Pennsylvania Turnpike
Comm'n, 149 A.2d 447 (Pa. 1959); Great N. Ry. Co. v. State, 173 P. 40 (Wash.
1918); Fruth v. Board of Affairs, 84 S.E. 105 (W. Va. 1915).
19. 80 U.S. 166 (1871).
20. 188 U.S. 445 (1903).
21. 243 U.S. 316(1917).
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struction, caused a piermanent or recurring physical invasion which materially destroyed or substantially impaired the usefulness of the land.2 2
Notwithstanding widespread liberalization as to the conception of the
"taking" concept, compensation has been denied in some cases on the
questionable rationale that the losses were only "incidental" consequences and not actual "takings." 23 Justice Sutherland in Sanguinetti v.
United States,24 while recognizing the expansion of the taking concept, 25
limited its scope in a case which held that an overflow onto claimant's
land was not compensable. The Court held that -theoverflow must be at
least "the direct result of the . . . [government activity] and constitute an actual, permanent invasion of the land, amounting to an ap-:
propriation of and not merely an injury to the property."2 6 Further,
the Court required a demonstration that the overflow was not within
27
the contemplation or reasonable anticipation of the government.
The situation was distinguished from Pumpelly and Lynah where there
was said to be an actual invasion and appropriation as a direct result
of the works. The overflowing of the canal, the Court reasoned, could
have occurred without such construction; therefore, the injury was held
to be indirect and consequential; thus no implied eminent domain obligation to compensate the owner could arise.28
Questions of directness and the extent of invasion became determinative factors in distinguishing a "taking" from mere consequential
"damages." According to Sanguinetti29 and cases following that line
of reasoning ° there was no taking unless the property had been in22. 80 U.S. at 181; 188 U.S. at 470; 243 U.S. at 328.
23. Bothwell v. United States, 254 U.S. 231, 233 (1920) (no requirement to compensate persons engaged in stock raising for the destruction of their business, or loss sustained through the forced sale of their cattle, as a result of the inundation of their
lands by the construction of a dam which made stock raising on them impossible);
Richert v. Board of Educ., 280 P.2d 596 (Kan. 1955) (depreciation in value of property owners' home caused by the condemnation proceedings for school construction not
a taking of their property, since the depreciation was only consequential damage); Sester v. Belvue Drainage Dist., 173 P.2d 619 (Kan. 1946) (drainage district held not
liable for the overflow of water onto plaintiffs land as a result of erosion of the banks
of a drainage ditch constructed by the corporation).

24. 264 U.S. 146 (1924).
25. Id. at 148-49.
26. Id. at 149.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 148-49.
29. Id.
30. Southern Pac. Co. v. United States, 266 U.S. 586 (1924); Christman v. United
States, 74 F.2d 112, 113 (7th Cir. 1934); Sponenbarger v. United States, 21 F. Supp.
28, 35 (E.D. Ark. 1937); Franklin v. United States, 16 F. Supp. 253, 260 (W.D. Tenn.

1936).
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vaded so as to "effectively destroy or impair ' 31 its use.
It was obvious that such a limitation, allowing compensation for direct interference resulting in injury but denying that which was consequential, often resulted in hardship to landowners.3 2 As a result, Illinois
in 1870 became the first state to adopt a constitutional provision 3
providing that private property could not be "taken" or "damaged"
for public use without compensation.
The purpose of such constitutional amendments was not to change
the substantive law of damages or to enlarge the definition of the
term. 4 The result was to make the law of damages uniform, so that
the property owner might recover against persons or corporations having the power of eminent domain under the same circumstances that
would have authorized recovery against one without such power. State
after state, following the lead of Illinois, amended its constitution so
that today the majority of states require that compensation must be
paid for property "damaged" as well as "taken."3 5
The end result of the expansion of the taking requirement is that
compensation for damage has been extended to every species of right
and interest which is the subject of ownership, corporeal, or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, real or personal, any interest that has an
exchangeable value or that goes to make up wealth or estate." The term
31. 264 U.S. at 149.
32. See, e.g., Bothwell v. United States, 254 U.S. 231 (1920); Sester v. Belvue Drainage Dist., 173 P.2d 619 (Kan. 1946).
33. ILL. CONST. art. II, § 15 (1870).
34. Stuhl v. Great N. Ry. Co., 161 N.W. 501, 502 (Minn. 1917).
35. "Damaged" or equivalent words appear in the following state constitutions: ALA.
CoNST. art. XII, § 235 (applies only to damages by municipal, private corporations,
and individuals vested with the power of eminent domain); ALAS. CONsT. art. I, § 18;
Aaiz. CoNsT. art. II, § 17; ARK. CONsT. art. 2, § 22; CAr.. CONsT. art. I, § 14; CoLo.
CONsT. art. II, § 15; GA. CONST. art. I, § III, par. I; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13; KY.
CONST. § 242 (applies only to damages by municipal and private corporations and individuals); LA. CONsT. art. I, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13; Miss. CONST. art. 3,
§ 17; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 26; MoNT. CONsT. art. III, § 14; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 21;
N.M. CONST. art. II, § 20; N.D. CoNsr. art. I, § 14; OKLA. CONST. art. H, § 24; PA.
CONST. art. I, § 10 (applies only to damages by municipal and private corporations
and individuals); S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 13; Tnx. CONST. art. I, § 17; UTAH CONST.
art. I, § 22; VA. CONsT. art. I, § 11; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16; W. VA. CONsT. art.
III, § 9; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 33. Stoebuck, Condemnation of Rights the Condemnee Holds in Lands of Another, 56 IowA L. REv. 293, 294 n.6 (1970) [hereinafter cited a Stoebuck].
36. Globe Indem. Co. v. Bruce, 81 F.2d 143, 150 (10th Cir. 1935); Samet v. Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank, 247 F. 669, 671 (4th Cir. 1917). See BLAck's LAw DicTIONARY 1382 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
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thus comprehends not only the thing possessed, but also the rights
of the owner in relation to
the land or thing including the right to
37
use.
the
from
others
exclude
In keeping with these developments, restrictive covenants or equitable servitudes became a compensable property interest in many
states.3
California, however, until March, 1973, was among the

states which had denied compensation.
11.

RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS IN CALIFORNIA.

The question of whether or not a building restriction in a deed con-

stitutes "property" under Article I, section 14, of the California constitution,39 thereby requiring compensation to a landowner who has been
37. See generally Town of Bedford v. United States, 23 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1927);
Woodside v. City of Atlanta, 103 S.E.2d 108 (Ga. 1958). Just as there may be a
"taking" if the condemnee's property interest is less than a corporeal fee simple, so
may the condemner "take" property interests of a novel kind which are less than corporeal fee simples. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (repeated low flights
by government planes constitute taking of an easement of airspace); Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922) (firing guns over plaintiff's land constituting a similar taking). Of interest is the conflict between Ackerman
v. Port of Seattle, 329 P.2d 210 (Wash. 1960) and Griggs v. County of Allegheny,
168 A.2d 123 (Pa. 1961). In both cases, repeated low flights, if attributed to an
agency with the power of condemnation, would clearly constitute takings under the ruling of Causby. In Ackerman, the Washington Supreme Court held that the muncipality
had taken an easement of navigation even though it neither owned nor operated any
of the planes. 329 P.2d at 217. In Griggs, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
there was no constitutional taking of property by the county (168 A.2d at 127), but
suggested that the injured landowner might recover in tort from the pilots or airlines.
Id. The conflict was resolved when the United States Supreme Court reversed the
judgment in Griggs. Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84 (1962). There
Justice Douglas writing for the majority observed:
A county that designed and constructed a bridge would not have a usable
facility unless it had at least an easement over the land necessary for the approaches to the bridge. Why should one who designs, constructs, and uses an
airport be in a more favorable position so far as the Fourteenth Amendment
is concerned?
id. at 89-90.
38. See, e.g., Town of Stamford v. Vuono, 143 A. 245 (Conn. 1928); Allen v. City
of Detroit, 133 N.W. 317 (Mich. 1911); City of Raleigh v. Edwards, 71 S.E.2d 396
(N.C. 1952); Meagher v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 77 S.E.2d 461 (Va. 1953).
Contra, United States v. Certain Lands, 112 F. 622 (C.C.D.R.I. 1899), alf'd sub nom.,
Wharton v. United States, 153 F. 876 (1st Cir. 1907); Friesen v. City of Glendale,
209 Cal. 524, 288 P. 1080 (1930); State ex rel. Wells v. City of Dunbar, 95 S.E.2d
457 (W. Va. 1956). See generally Aigler, Measure of Compensation For Extinguishment of Easement by Condemnation, 1945 Wis. L. REv. 5 [hereinafter cited as Aigler];
Brickman, The Compensability of Restrictive Covenants in Eminent Domain, 13 U. FLA.
L. REV. 147 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Brickman].
39. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14 provides in part, "Private property . . . shall not be
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation having first been made to
. . .the owner ...

"
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damaged by the construction of an improvement which violated the
restriction, was presented to the California Supreme Court in Southern
California Edison Co. v. Bourgerie.4 °

In 1964 Bourgerie purchased

a tract of land in Santa Barbara from the Bank of America. The deed
contained a provision that "property transferred [could not] be used

for an electric transmission station.

'41

Land retained by the Bank

adjacent to the defendant's property was subject to the same provi-

sion.42 Plaintiff, Southern California Edison Co., sought to acquire
the bank's land by eminent domain in order to build an electric sub-

station.43 Southern California Edison joined defendant Bourgerie in
its complaint against the bank,44 alleging that Bourgerie owned or
claimed some "right, title or interest" in the bank's land. Bourgerie
answered, claiming that the bank's land was burdened with a restriction
40. 9 Cal. 3d 169, 507 P.2d 964, 107 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1973).
41. Id. at 171, 507 P.2d at 965, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 77. The deed also prohibited
the use of the land for
nurseries, greenhouses, the keeping of animals or poultry for commercial purposes;
commercial beehives; the sale of used automobiles; auto wrecking yard; commercial schools; funeral parlor or mortuary; pawn shop; pet shop; animal hospital;
gas, gasoline or oil distributing plant; agricultural processing or packing plant;
blacksmith shop; trailer court; feed and fuel store; bath house or commercial
dance hall.
Grant deed, Santa Barbara County, Book 2061, at 1251 (July 21, 1964) [hereinafter
cited as Grant Deed].
42. Grant Deed, supra note 41.
43. Id. CAL. CMv. CODE § 1001 (West 1970) provides that any person may acquire
private property by eminent domain for any use specified in CAL. CODE Civ. PRO. §
1238 (West Supp. 1974). The section states that this right may be exercised by any public utility for electric power facilities. Bourgerie, in addition to its claim for compensation for violation of the restriction, had claimed that there was collusion between Southern California Edison and the Bank of America:
Before commencing the instant condemnation, SCE and the bank had arrived at
an agreement whereby the bank would sell its land to SCE. . . . However, since
the bank feared that its sale for a use forbidden by the deed restrictions which the
bank had exacted from the owners, would expose the bank to an action for
breach of the restrictions, the bank thereupon prevailed on SCE to bring the
instant condemnation action to get rid of the owners' restrictions on use of the
bank's land. . . . Mr. Peecook, the SCE employee in charge of its land acquisition,
characterized the instant condemnation action naming the bank as a defendant, as a
"friendly" condemnation, unprecedented in his experience,.
Brief for Defendant at 3, 103 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1972).
44. 9 Cal. 3d at 171, 507 P.2d at 965, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 77; see CAL. CODE Civ.
PRO. § 1244 (West 1967) providing, 'The complaint must contain . . . the names of
all owners and claim.ants, of the property, if known or a statement that they are unknown ... ." See also CAL. CODE Civ. PRO. § 1246 (West 1967) which provides:
All persons in occupation of, or having or claiming an interest in any of the
property described in the complaint, or in the damages for the taking thereof,
though not named, may appear, plead, and defend, each in respect to his own
property or interest, or that claimed by him, in like manner as if named in the
complaint.
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in his favor and that he would be damaged by the proposed construc4
tion. 5
The lower court rendered a verdict in Edison's favor. It observed that
the property sought to be condemned would be applied to uses authorized by law, 40 and, on the authority of Friesen v. City of Glendale,47 held
that the restriction did not create a compensable property interest in the
defendants.4 8
In overruling Friesen, the California Supreme Court held that the
grantees of land burdened with a building restriction against use for
a specific purpose have a "property right" with respect to a like restriction on the adjoining parcel retained by the grantor 9 and are therefore entitled to compensation under Article I, section 1450 whenever
damage results from a violation of the restriction. 1 The basis for the
court's decision was that a building restriction is substantially equivalent to an easement, which unquestionably is compensable "property."052 The court felt that to make a substantive distinction between
an easement and a building restriction by merely labeling the former
a property interest, for which compensation must be made, and the
latter a contractual right, which could be appropriated by a condemner
without any compensation, was "inequitable and rationally indefensi03
ble.",
In dissent, Justice Burke remarked:
The majority opinion extends the provision of Article I, section 14, of
the California Constitution to a degree previously unrecognized in this
state, thereby substantially affecting future eminent domain proceedings. This case alters longstanding California law to conform with the
rule in the "majority" of American jurisdictions on the issue of compensability of a "taking" of building restrictions in eminent domain proceedings. However, in doing so, the majority discards the conceptual basis
supporting the prior California position without submitting persuasive
reasons justifying the change. 54
45. 9 Cal. 3d at 171, 507 P.2d at 965, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
46. 103 Cal. Rptr. 719, 720 (1972). CAL. Civ. CODE § 1001 (West 1970); CAL.
CODE CIv. PRO. § 1238 (West Supp. 1974); see note 57 infra.
47. 209 Cal. 524, 288 P. 1080 (1930).
48. 103 Cal. Rptr. 719, 720 (1972).
49. 9 Cal. 3d at 171, 507 P.2d at 965, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
50. See note 39 supra.
51. 9 Cal. 3d at 171, 507 P.2d at 965, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
52. Id. at 172, 507 P.2d at 966, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 78-79; see 2 P. NIcHOLS, THE
LAw oF EmaNTr DoMn'i § 5.72 (3d ed. Rev. J. Sackman 1970) [hereinafter cited
as NicHoLs].
53. 9 Cal. 3d at 173, 507 P.2d at 966-67, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 78-79.
54. Id. at 175, 507 P.2d at 968, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
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Justice Burke55 relied primarily on Friesen v. City of Glendale,0 in
which the California doctrine denying compensation for a taking of
building restrictions was first announced.

In Friesen, a lot subject to a restriction to be used "for residence
purposes only" was acquired by the city for street use. In an action

brought by other lot owners in the neighborhood, the plaintiffs claimed
that the restriction was binding on the city unless their rights were
condemned, in which case they were entitled to compensation for their
proprietary interests in the lot taken.57

Although the case was de-

cided by a narrow interpretation of the covenant (i.e., that street construction did not violate the restriction),"" the court, in dictum, declared that:
The interest sought to be imposed . . . is no more than a negative
easement or an equitable servitude. It does not rise to the dignity of
an estate in land itself. It is not a property right, but is a contractual
right cognizable in equity as between the contracting parties, not binding on the sovereign contemplating a public use of the particular property taken. 59
Nor was support for Justice Burke's dissent limited to the Friesen deci-

sion. The proposition that building restrictions are mere contractual
rights has been relied upon by other courts in denying compensation
for the extinguishment of these equitable servitudes. The proposition
was first expressed in United States v. Certain Lands.6 The plaintiffs

claimed that some of the land taken was subject to restrictions which
would be violated by the proposed use, and, therefore, that they were
entitled to compensation for the violation of the restriction.
deeds to the land contained a provision that

The

55. Justice McComb also joined in the dissent.
56. 209 Cal. 524, 288 P. 1080 (1930).
57. Id. at 528, 288 P. at 1081.
58. Id., 288 P. at 1081-82.
59. Id. at 531, 288 P. at 1083. The defendants in Bourgerie had sought to distinguish Friesen on the ground that the condemner in that case was a political subdivision
(i.e., City of Glendale), whereas, in the principal case, the condemning body was a "private, profit-making corporation," and, therefore, did not come within the rule of Friesen.
9 Cal. 3d at 171, 507 P.2d at 966, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 77. The defendants argued that
when the sovereign is not the condemner, the rule denying compensation should not
apply. Thus defendants sought to limit Friesen to its facts and claimed that language
in that case to the effect that restrictive covenants are not compensable was dictum.
Defendant's Petition for Hearing before the California Supreme Court at 8. Inasmuch
as the instant case was ultimately decided on the grounds that restrictive covenants
were compensable "property" rights, the validity of the defendant's argument was not
determined. 9 Cal. 3d at 172, 507 P.2d 966, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
60. 112 F. 622 (C.C.D.R.I. 1899), affd sub nom., Wharton v. United States, 153
F. 876 (Ist Cir. 1907).

1974]

RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

"no slaughter house, smith shop, steam engine, furnace, forge, bone
boiling establishment . . . drinking saloon . . . shall ever be located
. . . upon any part of said granted land, and that no noxious, dan-

gerous, or offensive trade or business whatever shall ever be done...
on any part thereof.

... 61

After analyzing the restrictive language the court declared that it
has no reference to structures as structures, but rather has a reference
to uses of the lands. . and we would be going far beyond the bounds
of common experience were we to say that what the government has
acquired the right to do by virtue of the public necessity for national
defense is, in substance, what was contemplated and provided against
62
by the framers of the deed.
Given this interpretation, the government's use was found not to
violate the restriction, but the court -went on to indicate that even if
the restriction were violated, no "property" rights would have been
taken since parties could not by mutual covenants in private contracts
create for themselves an estate in land entitling them to compensation
by the state.6
On appeal the First Circuit Court of Appeals64 sanctioned the lower
court's finding that the contemplated use would not violate the restriction, and stated, in dictum:
[S]uch rights are often incorrectly spoken of as negative easements ....
If they were in fact easements, they would constitute true hereditaments, and the plaintiff in error would be entitled to the allowance
of damages, even if nominal.6 5
61. Quoted in 112 F. at 624-25.
62. Id. at 627.
63. Id. at 629. The court stated:
While the owners may so contract as to control private business, and thereby increase the value of their estates, they are not entitled to so contract as to control
the action of the government, or to increase the values of their lands by any expectation or belief that the government will not carry on public works in their vicinity, or that in case it does it will compensate them for loss due to the defeat
of their expectation that it would not ....
Each landowner holds his estate subject to the public necessity for the exercise of the right of eminent domain for public purposes. He cannot evade this by any agreement with his neighbor, nor can
his neighbor acquire a right from a private individual which imposes a new burden
upon the public in the exercise of the right to eminent domain.
Id. (emphasis added).
64. Wharton v. United States, 153 F. 876 (1st Cir. 1907).
65. Id. at 878. A similar result was reached in Moses v. Hazen, 69 F.2d 842 (D.C.
Cir. 1934). In that case, land was condemned for school purposes in the District of
Columbia. The question was whether or not the claimants were entitled to compensation for the violation of their right to insist upon certain restrictions upon the use of
the land taken. The restrictive language provided that buildings erected on the lots
shall be "'built for residence purposes exclusively [and] that neither the land nor any
buildings which may be erected thereon shall-be used for any trade, business, manufac-
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Those state courts which follow this precedent have concluded that

such restrictions do not fall within the category of true easements, such
as the right of passage or use. 6 They are looked upon, not as affirmative rights, but as wholly negative in character. As such, they are
held not to be easements in the strict sense of the word, but are classified by these courts as rights arising out of contract, which are enforceable in equity only between parties in privity. 67 They are said to create

no property interests. 6s
In rejecting this approach, Justice Mosk, in Bourgerie, stressed the

similarity between easements and building restrictions and the relative
damage occasioned by their violation. 69
Both easements and building restrictions may be created by agreements
made between private parties and, therefore, upon condemnation in
both situations the financial butden of the condemner is increased
turing, or mercantile purposes.'" Id. at 843. After noting that covenants must be
"strictly construed," the court concluded that "parks, playgrounds, and schools are not
within the limitation." Id. at 844. The court went on to say:
There is also a further ground on which the judgment of the trial court should
be sustained, which is that, as against the sovereign in discharge of a governmental
function, rights such as are here claimed are not enforceable to restrict or burden
the exercise of eminent domain; for the claims of these appellants are not for damare to what are sometimes called true easements, as right of passage or rights to
light and air, which are land and subject to condemnation as other interests in
land, but the restrictions on which appellants rely are not truly property rights,
but contractual rights, which the government in the exercise of its sovereign power
may take without payment of compensation.
Id. The court heavily relied upon the dicta in Certain Lands and Wharton.
No other authority was cited. More recent federal cases have rejected this view and
have held restrictive covenants compensable in eminent domain. Adaman Mut. Water
Co. v. United States, 278 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1960); United States v. Murphy, 220
F. Supp. 701 (D. Me. 1963); United States v. 11.06 Acres of Land, 89 F. Supp. 852
(E.D. Mo. 1950); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 539, comment a (1944).

66. See AM. Jim. Eminent Domain §§ 173-75 (1966); Annot. 4 A.L.R.3d 1137
(1965).
67. See Moses v. Hazen, 69 F.2d 842, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1934); Friesen v. City of
Glendale, 209 Cal. 524, 530, 288 P. 1080, 1082-83 (1930) (dictum); Smith v. Clifton
Sanitation Dist., 300 P.2d 548, 550 (Colo. 1956), noted in 26 FORDHAM L. Rnv. 130
(1957) and 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 133; Board of Pub. Instruction v. Town of Bay Harbor
Island, 81 So. 2d 637, 642 (Fla. 1955); Anderson v. Lynch, 3 S.E.2d 85, 89-90 (Ga.
1939), noted in 24 MINN. L. REv. 425 (1940) and 1 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 121 (1939);
In re Bd. of Educ., 89 A.2d 720, 722 (N.J. 1952); City of Houston v. Wynne, 279
S.W. 916, 920 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925), noted in 4 TExAs L. REv. 531 (1926).
68. See NIcHoLs, supra note 52, § 5.73; Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 1137, 1146 (1969). For
a discussion of the contention that some contracts create property rights within the
meaning of the fifth amendment, see Brickman, supra note 38, at 164-65, citing International Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399 (1931). See also the general dictum
of Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934), "Valid contracts are property,
whether the obligor be a private individual, a municipality, a state, or the United
States."
69. 9 Cal. 3d at 174, 507 P.2d at 967, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
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solely by virtue of agreements made between private parties. Equally
important, the violation of a building restriction could cause far greater
damage in monetary value to a property owner than the appropriation
70
of a mere right of way.
Obviously landowners are entitled to compensation if they have acquired legal easements appurtenant to the land taken, which are for
the benefit of their land. That being so, there seems to be no rational
reason why compensation should be denied when the increase in value
or the interest extinguished was created by a covenant instead of a
deed, and is called an equitable rather than a legal easement. Furthermore, covenants are placed on the land to enhance the marketable value by restricting prospective uses. Consequently, a valuable
equitable interest is created. The proprietary characteristics of this
interest have long been recognized by courts in this country. In
Sanborn v. McLean,7 ' the Supreme Court of Michigan characterized
a restrictive covenant as follows:
It runs with the land sold by virtue of express fastening and abides
with the land retained until loosened by expiration of its period of service or by events working its destruction. It is not personal to owners,
but operative upon use of the land by any owner having actual or constructive notice thereof. It is an easement passing its benefits and
carrying its obligations to all purchasers of land, subject to its affirmative or negative mandates. It originates for mutual benefit and exists
72
with vigor sufficient to work its ends.
Inasmuch as use is the major right of a property owner, it follows
that the ownership of a right to restrict the use of a certain parcel
is, to that extent, a property right. As stated in Johnstone v. Detroit,
G.H. & M.Ry. :7 "As the right to restrict the use of real estate is an
invasion of ownership, it would seem logical that it is done by virtue of a
'7 4
right or interest in such real estate.
I.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF COMPENSATION

Notwithstanding the force of the arguments characterizing restrictive
70. Id. at 173, 507 P.2d at 966, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 78 (footnote omitted), wherein
Aigler, note 38 supra, at 23-24 is cited. In his dissent, Justice Burke rejects this rationale by arguing: "[Ain easement is an affirmative right of use, whereas a building
restriction is wholly negative in character, amounting to no more than a promise not
to use property in a particular manner." Id. at 177, 507 P.2d at 969, 107 Cal. Rptr.
at 81.
71. 206 N.W. 496 (Mich. 1925).
72. Id. at 497.
73. 222 N.W. 325 (Mich. 1928).
74. Id. at 330.
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covenants as compensable interests, courts have set forth various reasons for denying compensation. The substance of the principal objection is that the right of eminent domain rests on public necessity and
that any attempt to deter the exercise of eminent domain by public
agencies should be considered an interference with sovereign authority
and, therefore, void. 75 The restriction is declared void from its inception, and thus no property right justifying compensation is recognized.
The court in Bourgerie alluded to these considerations by noting:
We need not contemplate in depth the somewhat esoteric dialogue on
the appropriate characterization of a building restriction, . . . An objective analysis reveals the real basis for the decisions which deny compensation for the violation of building restrictions by a condemner relates
to pragmatic considerations of public policy rather than abstract doctrines of property law, and it is upon these issues of policy that jurisdic-

tions choose between the minority and majority views."6
Thus, the dissent contended that "the right of eminent domain could
be defeated if the condemning authority had to respond in damages," 7"
and concluded that the scope of compensation in eminent domain
is a question of policy which is better left to the legislature. 78 The
"public policy" rationale has been heavily relied upon by other courts.
In Doan v. Cleveland Short Line Ry. 79 the Supreme Court of Ohio
denied recovery on "public policy" grounds. In that case, lots in a
subdivision were sold subject to a restriction that they would be "used
exclusively for residence purposes."80 The railway company, with notice thereof, acquired by purchase a number of these lots for the purpose of constructing a four-track railroad. The plaintiff was the owner
of another lot in the subdivision and sought to recover compensation
by way of damages resulting from the taking of an alleged property
right. 81 The court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recovery noting:
No covenant in a deed restricting the real estate conveyed to certain
uses and preventing other uses can operate to prevent the state, or any
75. See, e.g., Doan v. Cleveland Short Line Ry., 112 N.E. 505 (Ohio 1915).
76. 9 Cal. 3d at 173, 507 P.2d at 967, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 79 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 177, 507 P.2d at 969, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 81, quoting Smith v. Clifton Sanitation Dist., 300 P.2d 548, 550 (Colo. 1964).
78. Id. at 178, 507 P.2d at 970, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 82. Recognizing the complex
economic variables involved in the formulation of a judicially created -rule, the dissent
argued that the necessary information for a sound judgment was beyond the reach of
the court. Id.
79. 112 N.E. 505 (Ohio 1915).

80. Id. at 506.
81. Id.
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body politic or corporate having the authority to exercise the right of
eminent domain, from devoting such property to a public use. The
right of eminent domain rests upon public necessity, and a contract or
covenant or plan of allotment which attempts to prevent the exercise
of that right is clearly against public policy and is therefore illegal and
void.82
The court implied that the plaintiff was seeking to prevent the government from exercising its right of eminent domain. It cited United
States v. Certain Lands83 to the effect that such an application of restrictive covenants is void."4 A void covenant could not confer a property right, and, therefore, the plaintiff had no basis for a claim of dam5
ages.8
A basic weakness in utilizing the public policy argument to deny
compensation lies in the mistaken assumption that recognizing the validity of restrictive covenants will necessarily prevent the furtherance
of essential public activity. As one courts 6 has stated:
The fallacy of the argument lies in the assumption of its minor premise
that the requirement that the state compensate the owner of the dominant tenement for the taking of his interest in the servient tenement
actually interferes with the exercise of any governmental function.87
Indeed, if the minor premise were assumed, its logical extension would
result in the denial of compensation in any eminent domain proceeding.
There is, however, no such "interference" since the purpose of this
constitutional provision is to facilitate the appropriation of private
property for the public use, and to afford compensation to persons
therefor.8 8 The only effect of allowing compensation for restrictive
covenants would be to increase the financial and procedural burdens
of the condemner, 9 but this should not necessarily preclude compen82. Id. at 506-07 (emphasis added).
83. 112 F. 622 (C.C.D.R.I. 1899), af'd sub nom., Wharton v. United States, 153
F. 876 (1st Cir. 1907).
84. 112 N.E. at 506-07.
85. Id. Cf. Ward v. Cleveland Ry., 112 N.E. 507 (Ohio 1915) (suit to enjoin a
railroad from constructing tracts until compensation was paid).
86. Town of Stamford v. Vuono, 143 A. 245 (Conn. 1928).
87. Id. at 247.
88. Town of Sheridan v. Valley Sanitation Dist., 324 P.2d 1038, 1042 (Colo. 1928).
89. Two courts denying compensation appeared to have been greatly influenced by
the possibilities of multitudinous claims against the condemning body. Anderson v.
Lynch, 3 S.E.2d 85 (Ga. 1939); City of Houston v. Wynne, 279 S.W. 916 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1925). As a practical matter relatively few owners would receive more than
nominal damages for most governmental interferences.
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sation. If landowners may increase that burden by the creation of
legal easements or by adding physical improvements to their land, it
is difficult to understand why public policy should prevent the same

result merely because restrictive covenants are involved. 90
But the contention of those who would deny compensation for restrictive covenants is that, unlike other interests, the legitimate compensatory demands for the taking of equitable servitudes would be so

substantial as to inhibit necessary projects. Some courts have justified
the denial of compensation on the grounds that a condemner might
be required to join a large number of landowners as defendants in

1
cases where the benefit of the restriction runs to numerous lotsY

It is argued that such procedure would result in inhibiting the con-

demner's ability to acquire essential property. 92

This aspect can best

90. A leading case rejecting the public policy argument is Johnstone v. Detroit, G.H.
& M. Ry. Co., 222 N.W. 325 (Mich. 1928). There, the Supreme Court of Michiganr
held that owners of property within a restricted subdivision whose property was not
actually taken were nevertheless entitled to compensation upon a taking of a portion
of the subdivision for railroad purposes. The court discussed the various cases supporting the public policy rationale, and in rejecting it as a basis for the denial of compensation stated:
We cannot approve the application made in these cases of the doctrine of public
policy. The usual conveyance or contract affecting real estate contemplates its
use by persons to the exclusion of all other persons and the public. In the right
of use lies its value. The reasoning pursued, by reading the exclusive purpose out
of the instrument as illegal, would read into it an exception of public use. In direct point, it would enable the state to destroy a common-law negative easement of
light, air, and prospect without compensation. By analogy, it would deny payment
for the destruction of an easement of way, an unexpired rental term, increased
values due to attractive leases or uses, and, if pursued to its conclusion, injury to
the residue of a freehold when part is taken. All the authorities agree that these
interests are compensable.
Id. at 328. See generally Stoebuck, supra note 35; Horst v. Housing Authority, 166
N.W.2d 119 (Neb. 1969).
91. Board of Pub. Instruction v. Town Bay Harbor Island, 81 So. 2d 637 (Ala.
1955) (stating that a right of compensation for the construction of a public school
in violation of a covenant would present an obstacle of an unwarranted nature in the
exercise of the sovereign power); Friesen v. City of Glendale, 209 Cal. 245, 388 P.
1080 (1930); Smith v. Clifton Sanitation Dist., 300 P.2d 548 (Colo. 1956) (restrictive
covenants prohibiting use of properties for sanitary disposal system not enforceable
against a sanitation district, for to do so could defeat right of eminent domain in a
large subdivision situation); State ex rel. Wells v. Dunbar, 95 S.E.2d 457 (W. Va.
1956) (construction and maintenance of toll bridge on property for residential purpose
held not to require damages since to do so would greatly inconvenience or defeat exercise of eminent domain). See also CAL. CODE Civ. PRO. § 1246 (West 1967) which
provides in part:
All persons in occupation of, or having or claiming an interest in any of the property described in the complaint, or in the damages for the taking thereof, though
not named, may appear, plead, and defend, each in respect to his own property or
interest, or that claimed by him, in like manner as if named in the complaint.
92. 9 Cal. 3d at 174, 507 P.2d at 967, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 79. See also Friesen v.
City of Glendale, 209 Cal. 524, 288 P. 1080 (1930), wherein the court noted:
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be illustrated by the following remarks in City of Houston v. Wynne:9 3
Appellees' contention, if carried to its extreme, is that, if there .. .
were 10,000 lots, the city would be required to serve the owner or
owners of each lot in a suit to condemn any one of such lots for public purposes. Such contention, if established as the law governing such
matters, would be practically to prohibit the city from condemning
property so situated for public use. . . .94
It is this hurdle that the dissent in Bourgerie asserts will "return

to haunt us in the near future."

5

A quick answer to this position

is that the constitutional guarantee of compensation for the taking of

private property is not limited to inexpensive takings. It is undoubtedly true that in a number of cases the requirement of compensation
would place a heavy burden upon the state in its exercise of the power
of eminent domain. Yet a burden equally as heavy would be placed
The plaintiffs expressly "do not contend that parties may by private contract restrict the exercise of the power of eminent domain," yet by private contract with
their neighbors they have created, if their position be sustained, an estate inherent
in each lot in the tract protected against the taking or damaging thereof without
compensation and have brought about a situation where the number of the parties
defendant and of the interests to be appraisedin condemnation would be manifold.
lit cases of large tracts the increase in number would practically be prohibitive....
[S]uch results may be considered where we approach a contention that by private
contract an estate in land unknown to the common law or the law of this state
is created which would have the result of greatly increasing the cost of condemnation proceedingsand making them more burdensome on the public.
Id. at 530, 288 P. at 1082-83 (emphasis added).
93. 279 S.W. 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
94. Id. at 920.
95. 9 Cal. 3d at 178, 507 P.2d at 970, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 82. The majority in Bourgerie in rejecting this contention observed:
As to the procedural difficulties, while they are here not involved and we need
not decide the issue, it has been posited by some authorities that a condemner
need only selectively join in the action landowners whose property is most likely
to be damaged by the violation of the building restriction; there are other remedies
for excluded owners who anticipate the improvement will result in damage to their
property.
Id. at 174-75, 507 P.2d at 968, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
The number of parties can further be reduced by analyzing the remoteness of the
claimant's land from the property condemned. Even if there were 10,000 lots burdened
with building restrictions, the public taking of any one for an inconsistent use would
not necessarily result in the destruction of the negative easements in favor of all other
lot owners. Those lots adjacent to or in close proximity would be the only ones to
suffer a loss in most instances. As one commentator notes, "[Als the distance of the
claimant's lot from the invaded tract increased, the amount of compensation would rapidly dimish soon to the vanishing point." Aigler, supra note 38, at 32. Also what
would be a substantial injury to a lot in close proximity would actually benefit more
remote lot owners. For example, the location of a school in the division could be
of advantage to the neighborhood as a whole. Meredith v. Washoe School Dist., 435
P.2d 750 (Nev. 1968). Other types of public takings, such as for the purpose of a
nonrecreational park or a tree-lined highway divider would cause little or no damage
and, therefore, the number of intervenors would presumably be insubstantial.
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upon the landowner by refusing him compensation when the taking
of property in which he has an interest, by way of a restrictive covenant, would result in a sharp decline in the value of his own property.
If the choice is between the government's convenience and the citizen's economic loss, it would seem that a balancing of equities would
favor compensation. 96
The difficulty with this response is that the dissent regarded the
problem in terms of governmental need, not convenience, and implied
that questions such as these must be resolved in terms of a realistic
balance rather than through mechanical recitations of constitutional
language. But the majority was unwilling to assume that compensation for equitable servitudes would be uniquely burdensome." It con96. See 38 MICH. L. REv. 357 (1940). Bourgerie had also argued that where the
"damage inflicting party [i.e., Southern California Edison] possesses the means to
spread the cost of the injury, it should bear the burden thereof." Petition for Hearing
before California Supreme Court at 22 n.21, citing inter alia, Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). Furthermore, Bourgerie claimed that:
The policy of cost-spreading forms the essence of eminent domain law-namely,
that the damaged owner should not contribute disproportionately to the true cost
of the project for which expropriation is undertaken, and that the cost should be
spread upon members of the public who benefit from the project.
Petition for Hearing before California Supreme Court at 22.
97. Given the court's acceptance of restrictive covenants as compensable interests,
the measure of compensation becomes crucial. "Market value" is the prima facie measure of damages. People v. Buelton Dev. Co., 58 Cal. App. 2d 178, 136 P.2d 793
(1943). In eminent domain proceedings, this value is the price that would be paid
in the open market by a purchaser with full knowledge of all of the uses and purposes
for which the property is reasonably adapted. Daley City v. Smith, 110 Cal. App.
2d 524, 531, 243 P.2d 46, 50 (1952). Appurtenant easements have their value determined in connection with, and as part, of the dominant land, but the appropriate yardstick for the measure of compensation for restrictive covenants has not been uniformly
discerned.
American courts have split between two rules of compensation. The majority and
better reasoned rule looks to the value of the dominant tenement before and after the
taking. As expressed in Meredith v. Washoe County School Dist., 435 P.2d 750 (Nev.
1970):
The measure of compensation is the value of the interest that is extinguished.
But since the value of a restrictive covenant cannot be in the abstract, we must
look to the market value of the dominant tenement before and after the taking.
In substance, the value of the loss offset by the value of the benefits is the amount
of compensation to be awarded.
Id. at 753.
A few jurisdictions have adopted a different yardstick for the measure of damages,
which provides compensation for the market value of the servient tenement only. This
second view is grounded on the theory that:
As the sum of the parts can be no greater than the whole, it follows that when
the public has paid full value for the property taken, it has paid full value for
every estate or interest therein.
Fuller v. Town Bd., 214 N.W. 324, 325 (Wis. 1927). See Herr v. Board of Educ.,
83 A. 173 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 1912).
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ceded that the cost of condemning the property might be somewhat
increased, but concluded that such increases would not significantly
burden the exercise of eminent domain:
As a practical matter some takings would result in negligible damage
-to the owners of the restriction (e.g., public works such as parks or
access roads); if the character of the improvement were such that damage to some landowners would result (e.g., schools or fire stations),
it is likely that only those immediately adjoining or in close proximity
to the improvement would suffer substantial injury, even in highly restricted areas. 98
But to suggest that the construction of parks, access roads, schools
and fire stations would cause negligible or limited damage not only
fails to provide a comprehensive answer to the argument of the dissent, but also fails to respond to the problem presented by the facts
of the case. For the facts in Bourgerie involved not the construction
of a school or a fire station but the construction of an electric power
facility. 99 Although the damage implicated by the construction of a
school or fire station can be said to be limited to a confined area,
it is surely reasonable to suppose that the damage involved by the
construction of facilities such as electric power plants or nuclear generpating plants might engulf a substantial amount of property.
By avoiding the thrust of the dissent's argument, the majority concealed the ultimate scope of its opinion and simultaneously left its options open. If the court meant to imply that the only property owners
who could recover would be those "immediately adjoining or in close
proximity to the improvement,"'10 the court has avoided the necessity
for substantial compensation by adopting a fictional theory of damages.
Such a result would hardly comport with the court's desire to harmonThis measure of recovery set forth by the minority of jurisdictions appears inequitable as it would leave the property owner only partially compensated. For example,
suppose hillside homes are subject to a height restriction designed to preserve the view
of upper hillside homes, and a lower lot is taken for the purpose of building a power
station in excess of the height limitation. The market value of the servient lot is
$30,000 if unrestricted and $15,000 if restricted, whereas the value of the dominant
tenement, immediately above, is $45,000 with the restriction, but only $20,000 without.
What is the value of the building restriction, $15,000 or $25,000? The actual loss
suffered by the dominant tenement owner would be $25,000; however, under the minority view, only $15,000 would be recovered on the questionable rationale that the value
of the restriction vis-a-vis the servient lot is the only legitimate inquiry. The compensation under the majority view clearly appears more equitable in that the compensation
is commensurate with the loss suffered.
98. 9 Cal. 3d at 174, 507 P.2d at 967, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
99. Id. at 171, 507 P.2d at 965, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
100. Id. at 174, 507 P.2d at 967, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
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ize its theory of compensation with "'basic equitable principles of fair-

ness.' "101 Perhaps the underlying premise of the court is that if the
compensation necessitated by a governmental project is so substantial
that the cost would become prohibitive, the project should not be implemented. If this is the position of the court, Bourgerie can be read
as a decision maximizing the potential for local control of local development. In fact, the court has left the question open. If it wishes
to permit government development, it can limit the damages or claim
that the restrictive covenants were entered into in bad faith. If it
wishes to protect landowners from environmentally disruptive developments, it can threaten the condemner with substantial damages. In
short, Bourgerie provides California courts with a powerful instrument
to influence land development and local control.
IV.

COMPENSATION FOR OTHER LAND INTERESTS

The rationale of Bourgerie might well afford a basis for compensation for other interests in land which have heretofore been non-compensable in eminent domain proceedings. °2 In particular, possibilities of reverter' 03 and powers of termination 0 4 would appear to justify
such compensation when such interests have been taken.
When a possibility of reverter or power of termination is reserved,
the entire estate of the grantor is transferred, and the grantee, in effect, owns a fee simple absolute subject only to the possibility of termination or defeat by the fulfillment of -the condition precedent or
breach of the condition subsequent. 10 5 The interest of the grantor
is merely a possibility that ownership may revert to him if the condition
101. Id. at 175, ,507 P.2d at 968, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 80, quoting United States v.
Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973).
102. See 29 CAriF. L. Rlv. 525 (1941).
103. REsTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 154 (1936)

defines a reversionary interest as

"any future interest left in a transferor or his successor in interest." It further states
that "a possibility of reverter is any reversionary interest which is subject to a condition precedent."
104. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 155 (1936) notes that "a power of termination

is the future interest created in the transferor, or his successors in interest, by a transfer
of either an estate in land or an analogous interest in a thing other than land, subject
to a condition subsequent."

105. A basic distinction between a possibility of reverter and a power of termination
is that the former results from the expiration of a fee simple determinable, which terminates automatically on the happening of the condition (Renner v. Huntington Hawthorne Oil & Gas Co., 39 Cal. 2d 93, 244 P.2d 895, 899 (1951) ), whereas the latter
results from the divestment of a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, and re-

quires affirmative action on the part of the grantor. Santa Monica v. Jones, 104 Cal.
App. 2d 463, 232 P.2d 55 (1950).
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precedent is fulfilled or that a power to terminate the grantee's estate
and retake the property may arise if a breach of the condition subsequent should ensue. 10 6 These conditions, like restrictive covenants,
are used in conveyances to restrict the size and character of buildings
or the use to which the property may be put. Although clearly property rights,' 0 7 compensation has been denied in eminent domain proceedings on the ground that they are not "property interests" within
the meaning of the constitutional prohibition against the taking of private property without compensation.'0 8 In view of Bourgerie, recognition of these interests as compensable property rights would appear
appropriate.
CONCLUSION

The potential dimensions of Bourgerie appear unclear. The ostensible result is merely the adoption of the so-called majority view. However, California in this case may have afforded a scope of compensation for covenants beyond that which has heretofore been recognized
in other jurisdictions. The covenant in the instant case, unlike covenants in prior cases,' 09 was one which presumably could be violated
only by an entity with the power of eminent domain. Prior cases have
dealt with covenants which could have been violated by not only such
an entity, but also by a private grantee for non-public purposes. For
example, in United States v. Certain Lands" 0 the deed contained inter alia a provision that "no furnace. . . or other noxious, dangerous
or offensive trade shall ever be located on the premises." Clearly,
such a provision could be violated by public or by private entities.
On the other hand, in Bourgerie the restriction could only be violated
by a governmental or quasi governmental body with the power of eminent domain. It appears, therefore, that private landowners who mutually covenant in good faith to prohibit the use of their respective
parcels for a public function (e.g., prohibition of freeways, nuclear
power plants, airports) will be afforded compensation when one parcel
106. Parry v. Berkeley Hall School Foundation, 10 Cal. 2d 422, 425, 74 P.2d 738,
740 (1937); Schultz v. Beers, 111 Cal. App. 2d 820, 823, 245 P.2d 334, 336 (1952);
Santa Monica v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 2d 463, 473, 232 P.2d 55, 61-62 (1951).

107. See

RESTATYmFNT

OF PROPERTY § 163 (1936), which states that "a future in-

terest is an interest in land. .

....

108. Santa Monica v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 2d 463, 473, 232 P.2d 55, 61-62 (1951).
See 29 CALIF. L. REv. 525, 528 (1941).
109. See generally Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 1137 (1970).
110. 112 F. 622 (C.C.D.R.I. 1899), affd sub nom., Wharton v. United States, 153
F. 876 (1st Cir. 1907).

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

is condemned for the prohibited purpose. Such a result will undoubtedly encourage landowners to convenant against any and all public
activities in the hope of receiving greater compensation in the event
of condemnation proceedings. An increase in the cost of condemnation is inevitable. The question remaining to be answered, however,
is whether or not this increase will be so substantial as to actually

inhibit or discourage public projects.
While compensation is arguably justified for the development of a
power plant directly adjacent to one's property, perhaps a more logical
basis for compensation could be founded on inverse condemnation
rather than on the violation of a covenant."' 1 While recognizing the
possibly inadequate development of inverse condemnation as a viable
alternative, it seems that violation of restrictive covenants as the sole
foundation for compensation might lead to arguably unjust results
since only those who have contracted against such development would
be compensated. For example, where two individuals own land adjacent to a power plant, compensation for the harm caused therefrom
would inure only to the party who covenanted against such use. To

provide maximum protection under the presently adopted rationale,
111. In order to state a cause of action for inverse condemnation, there must be
an invasion or an appropriation of some valuable property right which the landowner
possesses, and the invasion or appropriation must directly and specially affect the landowner to his injury. See Hilltop Properties v. State, 233 Cal. App. 2d 349, 355-56,
43 Cal. Rptr. 605, 612 (1965). In the recent California case of Klopping v. City
of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972), the City of Whittier initiated condemnation proceedings against the plaintiff's property. Subsequently,
the city dismissed the action but declared its intention to take the property in
the future. Plaintiffs sued in inverse condemnation, alleging that the fair market value
of their properties had declined as a result of the city's announcement of its intention
to condemn. It was held that if the city had acted unreasonably in issuing precondemnation statements, either by delaying eminent domain proceedings or by other oppressive conduct, the plaintiff could maintain an action in inverse condemnation. The California Supreme Court severely limited this holding in Selby Realty Co. v. City of San
Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 514 P.2d 111, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973), wherein the
plaintiff asserted that the county's action in adopting a general plan amounted to a
"taking" of its property. The court rejected this contention by noting:
If a governmental entity and its responsible officials were held subject to a claim
for inverse condemnation merely because a parcel of land was designated for potential public use on one of these several authorized plans, the process of community planning would either grind to a halt, or deteriorate to publication of vacuous
generalizations regarding the future use of land. We indulge in no hyperbole to
suggest that if every landowner whose property must be affected at some vague
and distant future time by any of these legislatively permissible plans was entitled
to bring an action in declaratory relief to obtain a judicial declaration as to the
validity and potential effect of the plan upon his land, the courts of this state
would be inundated with futile litigation. It is clear, under all the circumstances,
that plaintiff has not stated a cause of action against the county defendants for
their declaratory relief or inverse condemnation.
Id. at 120-21, 514 P.2d at 117-18, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 805-06.
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mutual covenants should be entered into against any kind of possible
takings.

Bourgerie is one of several recent California Supreme Court cases' 12
in which judicial progressiveness has created a framework for environ-

mental protection; it is also seemingly unique in the interests protected. Not only are private property rights vindicated, but the environmentalists' interest in preserving the climate of private neighborhoods113 are similarly enhanced by greater, perhaps prohibitive, potential
expense in building environmentally disfavored projects. That the

Bourgerie case will in fact prove to inhibit environmentally disfavored
projects remains to be seen, but its impact will certainly be felt in emi-

nent domain proceedings.
CarolynM. Huestis

112. Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 1, 50 P.2d 1049,
104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972); Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98
Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971); Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal.
Rptr. 162 (1971).
113. A commentator has recently suggested that the holding of Bourgerie might be
limited to commercial property. 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 417, 422-23 (1974). Thus
the writer would suggest that commercial property owners should be compensated
while non-commercial property owners should not. It is difficult to reconcile this
reading of Bourgerie with that opinion's renunciation of Friesen v. City of Glendale,
209 Cal. 524, 288 P. 1080 (1930), a case which denied compensation to residential
owners, and it surely would be difficult to square it with the language and history
surrounding the law of eminent domain.

